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ABSTRACT 
As compared to adults, juveniles disproportionately falsely confess to crimes they did not commit.  Some attribute 
this to the fact that many children do not have the cognitive capacity to understand and voluntarily waive their 
Miranda rights.  Waiving Miranda rights can leave children vulnerable to coercive police practices, and, in the 
worst scenarios, can lead to false confessions and convicting innocent children.  In most cases, the only remedy left 
for juveniles trying to prevent incriminating statements from being used against them is by challenging the volun-
tariness of waiving Miranda rights, an almost impossible uphill battle.  This Article argues that current federal 
and state laws inadequately protect juveniles.  Additional safeguards that take into account age as providing a 
special status are needed in custodial interrogations, specifically a mandatory rule requiring juveniles to consult 
with attorneys before waiving their Miranda rights.  An attorney consultation would decrease involuntary waivers 
and ultimately protect vulnerable children from providing false confessions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On August 12, 2016, Federal Magistrate Judge Duffin overturned Bren-
dan Dassey’s conviction in the 2005 murder of Teresa Halbach because Das-
sey’s confession was found involuntary and therefore inadmissible.1  Dassey’s 
confession was central to his convictions of first-degree intentional homicide, 
mutilation of a corpse, and second-degree sexual assault.2  While being in-
terrogated on March 1, 2006, Dassey, who at the time was sixteen, “impli-
cated himself in the rape, murder, and mutilation of Teresa Halbach.”3  At 
trial, Dassey argued that his statements on March 1 were untrue, that he 
heard of Halbach only after she was reported missing, and that he made up 
the details in his confession.4 
Nonetheless, the Wisconsin trial court found Dassey’s confession volun-
tary and relied on the fact that: Dassey was in regular high school classes; he 
was interrogated while seated on a couch without any physical restraints; he 
was offered food and breaks; he was provided the Miranda warning and did 
not appear upset or intimidated; and “[i]nvestigators used normal speaking 
tones, with no hectoring, threats or promises of leniency.”5  Although the 
	
1 Dassey v. Dittmann, 201 F. Supp. 3d 963, 1006 (E.D. Wis. 2016), rev’d en banc, 877 F.3d 297 (7th 
Cir. 2017), petition for cert. filed, No. 17-1172 (Feb. 20, 2018).  The State of Wisconsin thereafter 
appealed Judge Duffin’s decision, and on June 22, 2017, a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit affirmed Judge Duffin’s decision to overturn Dassey’s conviction.  Dassey v. 
Dittmann, 860 F.3d 933, 956 (7th Cir. 2017) (“[N]o reasonable court could have come to the con-
clusion that Dassey’s confession was voluntary.”), rev’d en banc, 877 F.3d 297 (7th Cir. 2017).  The 
decision was later reversed by an en banc panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
on December 8, 2017, thereby upholding the Wisconsin trial court’s decision that Dassey’s confes-
sion was in fact voluntary.  Dassey v. Dittman, 877 F.3d 297 (7th Cir. 2017).  
 2 Dassey, 201 F. Supp. 3d at 975, 983. 
 3 Id. at 970. 
 4 Id. at 983 (“Dassey said he did not know why he had made various inculpatory statements.  Dassey 
speculated that the details he provided to investigators might have been gleaned from books, per-
haps one called Kiss the Girls.” (citing Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Filed by Brendan Dassey, 
Dassey v. Dittmann, 201 F. Supp. 3d 963 (E.D. Wis. 2016) (No. 14-CV-1310), ECF No. 19-21)). 
 5 Id. at 994 (“The court of appeals held that these findings of fact were not clearly erroneous.” (citing 
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Filed by Brendan Dassey, Dassey v. Dittmann, 201 F. Supp. 
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Wisconsin trial court judge and Judge Duffin assessed the voluntariness of 
Dassey’s confession under the same test, Judge Duffin ultimately found Das-
sey’s confession involuntary.  Judge Duffin relied on the fact that: Dassey was 
a juvenile and was questioned without an adult looking out for his interests; 
investigators repeatedly suggested they were looking out for Dassey’s best in-
terests; Dassey had below average intellect, making him more vulnerable to 
coercion; he was in regular high school classes, but required the support of 
special education services; he had no prior contact with law enforcement; 
and investigators repeatedly told Dassey they knew what happened and that 
Dassey had nothing to worry about.6 
Dassey’s case raises concerning questions about the reliability of juvenile 
confessions.  Whether or not Dassey falsely confessed, studies show that, as 
compared to adults, juveniles disproportionately falsely confess to crimes they 
did not commit.7  Some attribute this to the fact that many children do not 
have the cognitive capacity to understand and voluntarily waive their Mi-
randa rights.8  The Miranda warning was implemented in order to protect in-
dividuals from overly coercive police interrogation techniques that could lead 
to involuntary confessions.9  Despite this protection, children often waive 
their Miranda rights because they “do not understand the full range of conse-
quences that flow from a decision to waive those rights and speak with police 
officers.”10  By waiving their rights, children are left vulnerable and prone to 
coercion, and in the worst scenarios end up falsely confessing to crimes.11 
Despite the recognized cognitive difference between adults and juveniles, 
the Constitution provides juveniles and adults the same protection in custo-
dial interrogations.  If juveniles want to challenge their statements made dur-
ing an interrogation, they must show that their statements were not “made 
	
3d 963 (E.D. Wis. 2016) (No. 14-CV-1310), ECF No. 1-5)). 
 6 Id. at 1000–01. 
 7 See Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. 
L. REV. 891, 944 (2004) (stating that juveniles “are over-represented” in false confessions and “sug-
gesting that children . . . may be especially vulnerable to the pressures of interrogation and the pos-
sibility of false confession”). 
 8 See Kenneth J. King, Waiving Childhood Goodbye: How Juvenile Courts Fail to Protect Children from Unknow-
ing, Unintelligent, and Involuntary Waivers of Miranda Rights, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 431, 433 (highlighting 
a study revealing the limited ability of children to “comprehend the meaning and significance of 
the Miranda warnings”); Joshua A. Tepfer et al., Arresting Development: Convictions of Innocent Youth, 62 
RUTGERS L. REV. 887, 893 (2010) (“The cognitive, social, and emotional traits that make youth 
so different from adults may, in turn, make them especially vulnerable to the systemic factors al-
ready known to contribute to wrongful convictions.”). 
 9 Robert E. McGuire, A Proposal to Strengthen Juvenile Miranda Rights: Requiring Parental Presence in Custo-
dial Interrogations, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1355, 1365 (2000). 
 10 Tepfer et al., supra note 8, at 919. 
 11 See id. at 893–94 (“[C]hildren and teens are more likely than adults to falsely implicate themselves 
during police interrogation . . . .”). 
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voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.”12  Courts are directed to look at the 
totality of circumstances surrounding the interrogation to determine whether 
a Miranda waiver is voluntary.13  The Supreme Court has not provided spe-
cific factors that must be considered, nor how each factor should be weighed, 
and ultimately leaves discretion to judges.14  This totality test was applied in 
the Dassey case, and its application exposes three fundamental problems: (1) 
with the same facts, the Wisconsin trial court judge and a federal magistrate 
judge came to different conclusions on voluntariness; (2) judges are not re-
quired to give special weight to the fact that someone at the time of their 
interrogation is a juvenile; and (3) the totality test provides a retrospective 
protection and does not help a juvenile at the time a Miranda warning is read 
to them.  Although the federal protection is quite limited, some states provide 
additional protections where absence of a specific safeguard will trigger an 
exclusion of the Miranda waiver.  Some safeguards include requiring the ad-
vice or presence of a parent, guardian, or attorney before a juvenile can 
waive his or her Miranda rights, and others bar statements and confessions of 
children under a certain age.  
This Article analyzes whether additional safeguards are necessary to pro-
tect children in custodial interrogations.  Part I examines the link between 
wrongful convictions, false confessions, and juvenile vulnerability.15  Part II 
provides an overview of what the Supreme Court says on custodial interro-
gations and how some states are going further than federal requirements by 
adding additional safeguards.16  Finally, Part III argues that the current fed-
eral and state requirements are inadequate in protecting juveniles.17  Instead, 
mandatory rules requiring a juvenile to consult with an attorney before waiv-
ing his or her Miranda rights would offer better protection for juveniles.   
	
 12 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (“Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned 
that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against 
him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.”).  
 13 Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724–25 (1979) (“[T]he determination whether statements ob-
tained during custodial interrogation are admissible against the accused is to be made upon an 
inquiry into the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, to ascertain whether 
the accused in fact knowingly and voluntarily decided to forgo his rights to remain silent and to 
have the assistance of counsel.” (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475–77)).  
 14 David T. Huang, “Less Unequal Footing”: State Courts’ Per Se Rules for Juvenile Waivers During Interrogations 
and the Case for Their Implementation, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 437, 448–49 (2001).  
 15 See infra notes 18–86 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 87–142 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 143–87 and accompanying text. 
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I. LINKING WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, FALSE CONFESSIONS, AND 
JUVENILE VULNERABILITY 
“To date, 356 people in the United States have been exonerated by DNA 
testing . . . .”18  These cases reveal a troubling fact of our criminal justice sys-
tem—innocent people can be wrongfully convicted for crimes they did not 
commit.  By studying exoneree cases, a number of reoccurring factors have 
been shown to contribute to convicting the innocent: false confessions, eye-
witness misidentification, faulty forensic science, informants testifying against 
innocent people, inadequate representation, and procedural hurdles for ap-
peals and habeas proceedings.19  This Article looks specifically at false con-
fessions and the troubling fact that “more than 1 out of 4 people wrongfully 
convicted but later exonerated by DNA evidence made a false confession or 
incriminating statement.”20  Part A provides an overview of the facts and sta-
tistics on false confessions.21  Part B looks specifically at juveniles and why 
they are more prone to false confessions.22  
A.  False Confessions 
Significant weight is given to confessions during a trial.  The Supreme 
Court has stated, “A confession is like no other evidence. . . . [T]he defend-
ant’s own confession is probably the most probative and damaging evidence 
that can be admitted against him.”23  Underlying this fact is the assumption 
that people do not falsely confess.24  During closing arguments at Brendan 
Dassey’s trial, the prosecution stated, “People who are innocent don’t confess 
in the detail provided to the extent [Dassey] provided it.  They don’t do 
that.”25  Exonerations resulting from DNA testing have largely challenged 
this assumption, and studies have shown that psychological pressure and co-
ercive police interrogations can lead to people confessing to crimes they did 
not commit.26 Research also shows the troubling fact that people are able to 
	
 18 Exonerate the Innocent, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/exonerate/ (last 
visited May 20, 2018).  
 19 BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO 
WRONG 8–10 (2011). 
 20 False Confessions or Admissions, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/causes/ 
false-confessions-admissions/ (last visited May 6, 2018). 
 21 See infra notes 23–39 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 40–86 and accompanying text. 
 23 Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 296 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bru-
ton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 139–40 (1968) (White, J., dissenting)). 
 24 GARRETT, supra note 19, at 18.  
 25 Dassey v. Dittman, 201 F. Supp. 3d 963, 996 (E.D. Wis. 2016), rev’d en banc, 877 F.3d 297 (7th Cir. 
2017), petition for cert. filed, No. 17-1172 (Feb. 20, 2018).  
 26 GARRETT, supra note 19, at 18.  
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provide in great detail facts about a crime they did not commit.27  
In Brandon Garrett’s updated study on DNA exonerees, he found that 
68 out of 330 cases, roughly 20%, involved false confessions.28  Factors con-
tributing to false confessions during interrogations include: “duress, coercion, 
intoxication, diminished capacity, mental impairment, ignorance of the law, 
fear of violence, the actual infliction of harm, the threat of a harsh sentence, 
and misunderstanding the situation.”29 
Garrett examined the series of events that leads to someone falsely con-
fessing and revealed a concerning pattern.  Before an individual is interro-
gated, police are required to read individuals their Miranda rights.30  If indi-
viduals decide to waive their rights and speak to police, police are first 
instructed to ask open-ended questions.31  In fact, of the twenty-eight new 
cases of false confessions Garrett examines in his updated study, all of the 
individuals waived their Miranda rights.32  Once individuals waived their Mi-
randa rights, they were often left vulnerable to coercive police practices.  The 
Reid Technique, the leading police interrogation protocol, “instructs police 
to apply pressure but at the same time suggest that the suspect has something 
to gain by confessing.”33  Police can also lie and tell a suspect that they have 
damaging evidence proving an individual’s guilt.34  Taken together, an indi-
vidual may receive overwhelming psychological pressure to falsely confess. 
Although the Reid Technique allows coercive techniques, it warns police 
to “never contaminate a confession by feeding or leaking crucial facts.”35  
Despite the fact that police officers are instructed to never disclose to suspects 
specific, non-public facts about how a crime was committed, Garrett’s study 
reveals that police do not always follow their guidelines and sometimes con-
taminate confessions.36  Garrett’s study shows that the majority of exonerees 
	
 27 Id.  “Forty of the first 250 DNA exoneration cases (16%) involved a false confession.”  Id. at 18. 
“[A]lmost all[ ] of these exonerees’ confessions were contaminated.”  Id. at 19.  “Fourteen of these 
exonerees were mentally retarded, three were mentally ill, and thirteen were juveniles.”  Id. at 21.  
 28 Brandon L. Garrett, Convicting the Innocent Redux, in WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE DNA 
REVOLUTION: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF FREEING THE INNOCENT 40, 43, 46 (Daniel S. Medwed 
ed., 2017). 
 29 False Confessions or Admissions, supra note 20.  
 30 GARRETT, supra note 19, at 22. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Garrett, supra note 28, at 8.  
 33 GARRETT, supra note 19, at 22.  “Police engage in storytelling and offer the suspect a series of alter-
native narratives.  They try to get the suspect to initially agree to having committed legally excusable 
or less reprehensible acts.  For example, . . . police may try to get the suspect to admit to having 
attacked the victim, but only in self-defense.  Police may also imply that they might grant leniency if 
the suspect confesses or impose consequences if the suspect does not.”  Id. (footnote omitted).  
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. at 23.  Garrett further explains that “[t]he Reid manual advises that ‘[w]hat should be sought par-
ticularly are facts that would only be known by the guilty person.’”  Id. (second alteration in original). 
 36 Id. at 20.  
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who falsely confessed were able to provide key details about a crime, suggest-
ing that facts were fed to suspects during the interrogation process.37  Even 
more troubling is the fact that after an individual falsely confesses, he or she 
faces an uphill battle in preventing his or her statements from being used as 
evidence.  For example, if a defense attorney attempts to challenge a con-
taminated confession at trial, police officers could testify that they never dis-
closed facts to a suspect and that it was the accused that volunteered key 
information.38  Also, defense attorneys are unable to argue that a confession 
is false and unreliable because the Supreme Court does not require state-
ments to be truthful; statements need to be voluntary.39  
B.   Juveniles Are Cognitively Different from Adults and Are More Vulnerable to False 
Confessions 
Similar to adults, juveniles often waive their Miranda rights and end up 
succumbing to similar psychological pressures—coercive police practices 
during interrogations, relying on suggestions that something can be gained 
by confessing, and exposure to key details about a crime making a confession 
contaminated.  This is especially problematic for juveniles because they are 
cognitively different from adults and are therefore more vulnerable to the 
pressures contributing to false confessions.40  In Garrett’s study, he found that 
“[o]ver one-third of all sixty-eight false confessions involved juveniles.”41  
This Part provides evidence as to why juveniles are more vulnerable to false 
confessions: (1) science proves that children are cognitively different from 
adults; (2) the Supreme Court recognizes the difference between juveniles 
and adults; (3) studies show that juveniles are not as capable as adults in un-
derstanding their Miranda rights; and (4) interrogation experts say juveniles 
should be treated differently.  
Science proves that children are cognitively different from adults.42  Neu-
roscience has shown that adults and juveniles think and reason differently 
	
 37 See id. at 24 (“It is unlikely that innocent suspects could reconstruct the crimes out of whole cloth 
from their own imagination.”). 
 38 See id. at 28 (“[A]t trial, the police denied ever having disclosed . . . key facts.  The trial transcripts 
show that in twenty-seven of the thirty confession cases that went to a trial, the police officers testi-
fying under oath at trial denied that they had disclosed facts to the suspect, or they described the 
suspect having volunteered the central facts during the interrogation.”).  
 39 Id. at 37.  
 40 INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, REDUCING RISKS: AN EXECUTIVE’S GUIDE TO EFFECTIVE 
JUVENILE INTERVIEW AND INTERROGATION 4 (Sept. 2012), http://www.theiacp.org/por-
tals/0/pdfs/reducingrisksanexecutiveguidetoeffectivejuvenileinterviewandinterrogation.pdf [here-
inafter Police Report: REDUCING RISKS] (noting that the unique traits of juveniles make them more 
“likely to respond to the fear and stress of interrogation by making involuntary or false statements”).  
 41 Garrett, supra note 28, at 8. 
 42 King, supra note 8, at 434–45. 
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because juvenile brains are not as developed as adult brains.43  In particular, 
during adolescence the pre-frontal cortex of the brain is not fully developed.44  
The pre-frontal cortex is “responsible for judgment, problem-solving, and 
decision-making” and “regulates impulsive behavior by acting as a brake on 
the parts of the brain that are activated by fear and stress.”45  “Because juve-
niles are not fully developed until the end of adolescence,” certain traits 
unique to juveniles can be observed, such as “[d]ifficulty weighing and as-
sessing risks,” “[e]mphasis on immediate rewards rather than long-term con-
sequences,” and “[v]ulnerability to external pressure.”46 
This science explains why countless juveniles have falsely confessed to 
crimes they did not commit.  For example, Nga Truong, only sixteen years old 
at the time of her arrest, falsely confessed to smothering her thirteen-month-
old baby to death.47  Truong spent three years in jail awaiting her trial.48  Pros-
ecutors eventually dropped the charges after a judge “tossed out the confession, 
ruling it was the product of deception, trickery and implied promises to a fright-
ened teenager.”49  While Truong was interrogated, she did not have a parent 
or lawyer present, was not given a proper Miranda warning, and eventually 
gave interrogators what they wanted to hear when promised that she and her 
brothers would be able to go to a foster home.50  Similarly, in the well-publi-
cized Central Park jogger case, five juveniles, ages fourteen to sixteen at the 
time, were wrongfully convicted of brutally beating and raping a woman.51  
Four of the men served about seven years in prison, and one man served thir-
teen years.52  Their convictions ultimately rested on incriminating false state-
ments.53  The film, The Central Park Five, depicts these five juveniles pressured 
into implicating themselves and reveals the cascading effect of false state-
ments—the ability of using one confession to get another confession.54 
Not only does science recognize that children are cognitively different 
	
 43 Id. at 437–40 (describing recent developments in neuroscience).  
 44 Police Report: REDUCING RISKS, supra note 40, at 4.  
 45 Id.; see also King, supra note 8, at 441 (concluding that “adolescents are much less able to engage in 
sound hypothetical, contingent reasoning than are adults and that the physiological immaturity of 
adolescent brains is a major factor in adolescents’ inability to perform these tasks”).  
 46 Police Report: REDUCING RISKS, supra note 40, at 4. 
 47 David Boeri, Woman in Tossed-Out Confession Gets $2.1M Settlement from Worcester, WBUR: ALL THINGS 
CONSIDERED (June 30, 2016), http://www.wbur.org/all-things-considered/2016/06/30/nga-tru-
ong-worcester-settlement.  
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. 
 51 THE CENTRAL PARK FIVE (PBS 2012). 
 52 Benjamin Weiser, 5 Exonerated in Central Park Jogger Case Agree to Settle Suit for $40 Million, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 19, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/20/nyregion/5-exonerated-in-central-park-
jogger-case-are-to-settle-suit-for-40-million.html?_r=0. 
 53 Id. 
 54 THE CENTRAL PARK FIVE (PBS 2012). 
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from adults, the Supreme Court also recognizes that there are fundamental 
differences between juveniles and adults.  In Roper v. Simmons, the Court abol-
ished the death penalty for juveniles, relying on three general differences be-
tween juveniles and adults: (1) juveniles lack maturity and have “an underde-
veloped sense of responsibility”; (2) “juveniles are more vulnerable or 
susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures”; and (3) juveniles are 
not as formed as adults.55  Based on these differences, the Court concluded 
that juveniles could not be given the harshest penalty because they are not as 
culpable as a fully developed adult, and therefore cannot be classified with the 
worst offenders.56  In Graham v. Florida, the Court held that life without parole 
sentences for juveniles who did not commit a homicide was unconstitutional.57  
The Court in Graham relied on the Court’s earlier reasoning in Roper that rec-
ognized juveniles as less culpable and thereby less deserving of the most severe 
punishments.58  The Court in Miller v. Alabama also relied on the rationale in 
Roper and Graham that juveniles are less culpable and held that mandatory life 
without parole sentences for juveniles were unconstitutional.59 
The Court has also stated that a child’s age “generates commonsense 
conclusions about behavior and perception.”60  In J.D.B. v. North Carolina, the 
Court held that a child’s age must be considered when determining whether 
a child is in custody for interrogation purposes.61  The Court in J.D.B. noted 
how it has “[t]ime and again” drawn “commonsense conclusions” that chil-
dren are “less mature and responsible than adults,” “often lack the experi-
ence, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could 
	
 55 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 (2005).  
 56 Id. at 571 (“Once the diminished culpability of juveniles is recognized, it is evident that the peno-
logical justifications for the death penalty apply to them with lesser force than to adults.”). 
 57 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010).  
 58 Id. at 68–71. 
 59 Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 469–70 (2012).  “Because ‘[t]he heart of the retribution rationale’ 
relates to an offender’s blameworthiness, ‘the case for retribution is not as strong with a minor as 
with an adult.’”  Id. at 472 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Gra-
ham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 71 (2010)).  
 60 J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 272 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 674 (2004)). 
 61 Id. at 277.  An individual is only read their Miranda rights when they are rendered “in custody.”  Id. 
at 270 (quoting Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994) (per curiam))).  To determine 
whether someone is in custody, “the court must apply an objective test to resolve the ultimate in-
quiry: was there a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with 
formal arrest.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 
99, 112 (1995)).  The objective test involves looking at the totality of circumstances surrounding an 
interrogation, “including any circumstance that ‘would have affected how a reasonable person’ in 
the suspect’s position ‘would perceive his or her freedom to leave.’”  Id. at 271 (quoting Stansbury, 
511 U.S. at 325 ).  By taking into account a child’s age, courts must recognize the reality that “a 
reasonable child subjected to police questioning will sometimes feel pressured to submit when a 
reasonable adult would feel free to go.”  Id. at 272.  
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be detrimental to them,” and “‘are more vulnerable or susceptible to . . . out-
side pressures’ than adults.”62  The Court also noted how law has historically 
treated adults and children differently.63  For example, juveniles are limited 
in their ability to purchase alcohol and tobacco products, gamble, enter into 
binding contracts, and marry without parental consent.64  
In the context of juveniles waiving Miranda rights and their ability to fully 
understand the consequences of waiving rights of silence and counsel, studies 
show that juveniles, especially those under fifteen, are unable to meet the 
adult standard for adequately comprehending these rights.65  For example, 
44.8% of juveniles, as compared to 14.6% of adults, misunderstood their 
right to consult an attorney and have an attorney present during an interro-
gation.66  Juveniles were often confused as to the “time and place an attorney 
could be consulted, ‘interrogation’ often being misconstrued as an adjudica-
tion hearing.”67  Additionally, 23.9% of juveniles, as compared to 8.5% of 
adults, misunderstood the statement that anything said during an interroga-
tion could be used against them in court.68  Also, 61.8% of juveniles, as com-
pared to 21.7% of adults, did not recognize that a judge could not penalize 
an individual for invoking their right to silence.69 
“When a person doesn’t understand [his or her Miranda] rights, those 
rights have no meaning.”70  By misunderstanding Miranda rights, children 
will often waive their rights, leaving key constitutional rights unprotected.71  
Once a child waives their rights, police may interrogate a child using similar 
techniques as adults, sometimes resulting in false confessions.72  For example, 
a thirteen-year-old boy in California spent three years in prison after waiving 
	
 62 Id. at 272 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 
455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982); then quoting Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979); and then quoting 
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005)).  
 63 Id. at 273.  
 64 See id. at 273–74 (“[C]hildren cannot be viewed simply as miniature adults.”); State v. Fernandez, 
712 So. 2d 485, 490 (La. 1998) (Johnson, J., dissenting) (stating society has chosen to disallow minors 
from consuming alcohol or gambling regardless of the individual minor’s maturity and intelligence).  
 65 Thomas Grisso, Juveniles’ Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights: An Empirical Analysis, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 
1134, 1152 (1980). 
 66 Id. at 1154.  
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. at 1158. 
 70 HumanRightsWatch, You Have the Right to Remain Silent – California Bill Strengthens Miranda for Kids, 
YOUTUBE (Aug. 17, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z-VW8Ldw6YI&t=30s.  Chil-
dren have “less capacity to understand their rights.”  
 71 Id. 
 72 See Joshua A. Tepfer & Laura H. Nirider, Adjudicated Juveniles and Collateral Relief, 64 ME. L. REV. 
553, 556 (2012) (“[H]igher incidence of false confessions among juveniles exists because standard 
police tactics—which in all probability were designed with the hardened adult suspect in mind—
are frequently deployed against far softer targets: children and adolescents.”).  
	
May 2018] JUVENILE MIRANDA WAIVERS 1221 
his Miranda rights and falsely confessing to a murder he did not commit.73 
In a California case, In re Joseph H., a ten-year-old boy shot his father to 
death.  Although it was not a wrongful conviction case, the case highlights an 
extreme example of a court finding that a ten-year-old could voluntarily waive 
his Miranda rights.74  A California appeals court found that “Joseph’s responses 
indicated he understood,” that “[n]othing in the record supports the premise 
that he was confused or suggestible,” and that “the interview shows he had no 
trouble communicating, aside from needing explanation of a few terms.”75  
Although the Supreme Court of California denied a petition to review the case, 
Justice Liu provided a dissenting statement that challenged the lower court’s 
finding that ten-year-old Joseph understood his Miranda rights and the conse-
quences of waiving those rights.  Justice Liu’s dissent draws on common sense 
and science to question Joseph’s capacity to understand his rights, and he uses 
the exchange between the detective and Joseph to illustrate this point.76  Before 
the interrogation began, the detective said, “So, you have the right to remain 
silent.  You know what that means?”77  Joseph replied, “Yes, that means that 
I have the right to stay calm.”78  The detective explained, “That means y-you 
do not have to talk to me.”79  Joseph responded, “Right.”80  Without further 
explanation, the detective moved on to other questions.  Joseph’s response ar-
guably illustrates that a ten-year-old child cannot comprehend Miranda rights 
and the legal implications of waiving those rights. 
Finally, interrogation experts say juveniles should be treated differently.  
The Reid Technique explains that “special precautions” should be taken 
when interrogating juveniles.81  The technique recognizes that juveniles are 
more vulnerable to false confessions, and that interrogators should corrobo-
rate statements to ensure accuracy.82  In terms of reading a juvenile’s behav-
ior in determining guilt or innocence, the Reid Technique’s website states, 
	
 73 HumanRightsWatch, supra note 70. 
 74 Joseph was read his Miranda rights and then interrogated in order to determine whether he under-
stood the wrongfulness of shooting his father.  In re Joseph H., 188 Cal. Rptr. 3d 171, 181–82 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2015).  
 75 Id. at 186.  
 76 In re Joseph H., 367 P.3d 1, 3 (Cal. 2015) (Liu, J., dissenting). 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Making a Murderer: The Reid Technique and Juvenile Interrogations, JOHN E. REID & ASSOCIATES, INC. 
(Jan. – Feb. 2016), http://reid.com/educational_info/r_tips.html?serial=20160101-
1&print=%5Bprint.  But see Tepfer & Nirider, supra note 72, at 556 (noting that the “special caution” 
is “underemphasized in Reid’s interrogation manual and trainings, and is rarely implemented in 
real life”).  
 82 Making a Murderer: The Reid Technique and Juvenile Interrogations, supra note 81. 
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“Due to immaturity and the corresponding lack of values and sense of re-
sponsibility, the behavior symptoms displayed by a youthful suspect may be 
unreliable.”83  It also recognizes that juveniles may not be able to understand 
their Miranda rights and the implications of a waiver.84  The website advises 
against using “trickery and deceit” tactics that are commonly used on adults, 
including tactics that involve using fictitious evidence.85  “[Juvenile] suspects 
may not have the fortitude or confidence to challenge such evidence and, 
depending on the nature of the crime, may become confused as to their own 
possible involvement if the police tell them evidence clearly indicates they 
committed the crime.”86 
II.  CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS AND MIRANDA WAIVERS: FEDERAL 
AND STATE REQUIREMENTS  
Federal and state laws purportedly protect juveniles during custodial in-
terrogations by taking into account the specific needs of juveniles.  A custo-
dial interrogation means “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers 
after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his free-
dom of action in any significant way.”87  This Part provides an overview of 
federal and state requirements during custodial interrogations of juveniles 
and examines the shortfalls of this current regime.  By failing to fully address 
juvenile vulnerability, the current regime does not provide the necessary safe-
guards to decrease the unacceptable risk of false confessions and wrongful 
convictions. Part A examines what the Supreme Court requires during cus-
todial interrogations.88  Part B provides an overview of measures taken by 
states to provide additional protections for children.89  Finally, Part C pro-
vides the rationale by proponents and opponents of additional safeguards.90   
A.  Federal Requirements 
Haley v. Ohio was the first case that the Supreme Court recognized that 
juveniles as a class have special status during custodial interrogations.91  In 
Haley, a fifteen-year-old was convicted of first degree murder after confessing 
	
 83 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting FRED E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL 
INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS (5th ed. 2011)). 
 84 Id. (“Certainly a child under the age of ten is incapable of fully understanding the implications of 
waiving Miranda rights.  Younger adolescents also may fall into this category.”). 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). 
 88 See infra notes 91–111 and accompanying text. 
 89 See infra notes 112–22 and accompanying text. 
 90 See infra notes 123–42 and accompanying text. 
 91 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948); see also Huang, supra note 14, at 442.  
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to the crime.  His conviction was challenged on the basis that his confession 
was obtained in a manner that violated the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.92  From midnight until 5:00 AM, five to six police offic-
ers interrogated the boy without the presence of counsel or anyone else look-
ing out for the boy’s interests. 93   Eventually the boy signed a written 
confession.94  The Court focused on the age of the boy and reversed his con-
viction because the methods used were inappropriate for juveniles.95  The 
Court stated, “[W]hen . . . a mere child—an easy victim of the law—is be-
fore us, special care in scrutinizing the record must be used.”96  The Court 
also recognized the importance of having counsel or someone else looking 
out for the boy’s interests during the interrogation.97 
Similar to Haley, the Court in Gallegos v. Colorado overturned the convic-
tion of a juvenile because obtaining a fourteen-year-old boy’s confession vi-
olated due process.98  The boy was held for five days without access to a par-
ent, lawyer, or an adult looking out for his interests, making the interrogation 
coercive.99  Consistent with Haley, the Court recognized the youthfulness of 
the boy as a crucial factor.100  Also similar to Haley, the Court focused on the 
need to have an adult present to ensure a juvenile’s interests are being looked 
after.  The Court stated, 
He cannot be compared with an adult in full possession of his senses and 
knowledgeable of the consequences of his admissions.  He would have no 
way of knowing what the consequences of his confession were without advice 
as to his rights—from someone concerned with securing him those rights—
and without the aid of more mature judgment as to the steps he should take 
in the predicament in which he found himself.101 
Protections for juveniles during custodial interrogations expanded with 
the decision in Miranda v. Arizona and In re Gault.  The Court in Miranda held 
that prior to questioning, an individual “must be warned that he has the right 
to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence 
against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either 
	
 92 Haley, 332 U.S. at 599. 
 93 Id. at 598. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. at 599–601. 
 96 Id. at 599.  “A 15-year-old lad, questioned through the dead of night by relays of police, is a ready 
victim of the inquisition. . . . [W]e cannot believe that a lad of tender years is a match for the police 
in such a contest.”  Id. at 599–600. 
 97 Id. at 600.  “He needs counsel and support if he is not to become the victim first of fear, then of 
panic.  He needs someone on whom to lean lest the overpowering presence of the law, as he knows 
it, crush him.”  Id. 
 98 370 U.S. 49, 55 (1962).  
 99 Id. at 50.  
 100 Id. at 53. 
 101 Id. at 54.  
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retained or appointed.”102  The Court also stated that these rights could be 
waived, “provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelli-
gently.”103  However, if an interrogation proceeds without a Miranda warning 
or an appropriate waiver, statements made during an interrogation may not 
be used against a suspect at trial.104 
The Court’s decision in In re Gault held that even in adjudicatory pro-
ceedings, juveniles must be provided procedural safeguards, including the 
right against self-incrimination and the right to counsel.105  The Court also 
briefly recognized that “depending upon the age of the child and the pres-
ence and competence of parents” during an interrogation, different tech-
niques may be needed to achieve a voluntary Miranda waiver.106  The Court 
stated, “[T]he greatest care must be taken to assure that [a juvenile’s] admis-
sion was voluntary.”107  Despite the Court’s recognition of alternative tech-
niques, In re Gault did not provide lower courts with clear guidelines on how 
to determine the voluntariness of Miranda waivers.108 
Fare v. Michael C. provided the test used today in determining whether 
juveniles voluntarily waived their Miranda rights.  Courts are directed to look 
at the totality of circumstances surrounding the interrogation to determine 
whether a Miranda waiver is voluntary.109  If the waiver is voluntary, state-
ments made during a custodial interrogation may be used against the ac-
cused.110  The Court noted that the totality of circumstance approach “man-
dates . . . inquiry into all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation,” 
including “evaluation of the juvenile’s age, experience, education, back-
ground, and intelligence,” in order to determine whether a juvenile under-
stands his or her Miranda rights, the nature of those rights, and the conse-
quences of a waiver.111  Though age is a factor to be considered, Fare does 
not require that it be given significant weight in determining voluntariness.  
	
 102 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).  
 103 Id.  A waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently if it is “the product of a free and 
deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception,” and it “must have been made 
with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the 
decision to abandon it.”  Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986). 
 104 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479.  
 105 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967). 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Huang, supra note 14, at 445. 
 109 Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724–25 (1979). 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. at 725. 
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B.  Additional State Procedural Safeguards 
Some states have gone further than federal law in order to provide addi-
tional safeguards for juveniles during custodial interrogations.112  A number 
of states have per se rules, which means that if a rule is not followed, a Miranda 
waiver could be found involuntary.113  These additional protections arrive by 
statute and judicial decisions.114  Some states require the advice or presence 
of a parent, guardian, or attorney before waiving Miranda rights.  For exam-
ple, in Colorado, statements are only admissible into evidence if during a 
custodial interrogation a “parent, guardian, or legal or physical custodian of 
the juvenile” was present.115  In Massachusetts, the state must “show that a 
parent or an interested adult was present, understood the warnings, and had 
the opportunity to explain his rights to the juvenile so that the juvenile un-
derstands the significance of waiver of these rights.”116  Other states bar the 
confessions or statements from children under a certain age altogether.  For 
example, in New Mexico, “confessions, statements or admission” by children 
under thirteen are barred.117 
The majority of states, however, provide a tiered approach to providing 
additional protections for children—more protections are provided to 
younger children, and as children get older, those protections decrease.118  
For example, although New Mexico bars statements by children under thir-
teen, “fifteen, sixteen, and seventeen-year-olds receive no specific protec-
tions.”119  In Connecticut, statements made by children under sixteen are 
	
 112 See Brief of Amicus Curiae Human Rights Watch in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8, 
Joseph H. v. California, 137 S. Ct. 34 (2016) (No. 15-1086) [hereinafter Brief] (“Seventeen states 
have specific statutes regulating in some form the custodial interrogation of children.  The remain-
ing thirty-three states and the District of Columbia have no specific regulations and instead use the 
same totality-of-the-circumstances test that applies to adults.”).  Seventy-five percent of juveniles 
arrested each year reside in jurisdictions that use the Fare totality test, so most juveniles in the U.S. 
are not able to benefit from the minority of states that provide additional safeguards.  Id.  
 113 See Barry C. Feld, Juveniles’ Competence to Exercise Miranda Rights: An Empirical Study of Policy and Practice, 
91 MINN. L. REV. 26, 36–37 (2006) (“These states have prospectively adopted a categorical policy 
to prevent invalid waivers, rather than trying to assess after-the-fact the impact of immaturity on 
the validity of each individual waiver under the ‘totality of the circumstances.’”). 
 114 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 25, Joseph H. v. California, 137 S. Ct. 34 (2016) (No. 15–1086) 
[hereinafter Petition]. 
 115 COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-2-511(1) (2017); see also IND. CODE § 31-32-5-1 (2017) (requiring consent 
by counsel or a “custodial parent, guardian, custodian, or guardian ad litem” in order to waive 
Miranda rights). 
 116 Commonwealth v. A Juvenile (No. 1), 449 N.E.2d 654, 657 (Mass. 1983). Vermont provides a 
similar safeguard.  See In re E.T.C., 449 A.2d 937, 940 (Vt. 1982) (noting that a juvenile may only 
waive his or her Miranda rights if “given the opportunity to consult with an adult”). 
 117 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-2-14(F) (2009). 
 118 Brief, supra note 112, at 10.  
 119 Id. 
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inadmissible unless made in the presence of a parent or guardian, yet chil-
dren sixteen and older do not receive similar protections.120  Kansas has a 
similar rule to Connecticut, but the protection is only guaranteed for children 
under fourteen.121  Most states do not require consultation with an attorney; 
however, Illinois is unique in that children who are under fifteen and commit 
certain crimes “must be represented by counsel throughout the entire custo-
dial interrogation.”122 
C.  Arguments For and Against Additional Safeguards 
There is much debate as to whether the Fare totality test and state specific 
safeguards provide adequate protection for children during custodial inter-
rogations—specifically protecting against involuntary Miranda waivers, 
which leave children exposed to pressures that may lead to a false confession 
and wrongful conviction.  Although states may go further than what is feder-
ally required, proponents of additional safeguards at the federal level argue 
that the current regime has led to a patchwork of laws and inconsistent out-
comes based on age and where a juvenile lives.123  Opponents of additional 
safeguards at the state and federal level argue that the current Fare totality 
test is sufficient.  This Part first explores the arguments for and against the 
Fare totality approach, and then examines the arguments for and against re-
quiring additional safeguards.  
As mentioned above, most states do not provide additional safeguards 
and use the Fare totality test to determine whether a juvenile voluntarily 
waived his or her Miranda rights.  Because the Court in Fare did not provide 
much guidance as to how the totality test should be applied, lower courts are 
provided discretion in determining the factors to be considered in the totality 
test and how each factor should be weighed.124 
  The most common features of the states’ formulations of the totality test 
are: consideration of the child’s age, intelligence, education and mental con-
dition; whether a parent or other adult advisor is present; prior experience 
with courts or law enforcement, if any; and the nature of the questioning 
(including the length, tone, accusatory nature, police tactics, and time and 
place of questioning).125 
Proponents of the Fare totality test argue it is sufficient in protecting juve-
	
 120 CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 46b-137(a)–(b) (2012).  
 121 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2333 (2006). 
 122 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5–170 (2017).  
 123 Brief, supra note 112, at 14. 
 124 See King, supra note 8, at 454 (noting that “each state defines the totality that is relevant” to the 
determination of whether a Miranda waiver was uncoerced “somewhat differently”). 
 125 Id. at 455.  
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niles because it allows full consideration of circumstances particular to juve-
niles (for example, age, intelligence, and maturity).126  Opponents argue, 
however, that despite the fact that a number of courts may take into account 
age and the particular vulnerability of juveniles, courts may weigh the im-
portance of factors particular to juveniles differently; “[t]here is no assurance, 
for example, that courts will consider the empirical evidence that juveniles 
do not comprehend Miranda warnings as well as adults.”127  Consequently, 
the same set of facts may render different outcomes.128 
Proponents also argue that the totality test minimizes interference with 
police work, and that the test sufficiently balances the state’s interest in effec-
tive police investigations with a juvenile’s interest in ensuring a Miranda 
waiver is voluntary.129  In contrast, opponents argue that the test “creates 
uncertainty and speculation among law enforcement officials about whether 
a juvenile’s statements may be admissible at trial.”130  Opponents also argue 
that the test leaves juveniles with an after-the-fact remedy because challeng-
ing the voluntariness of a waiver would require a motion to suppress the 
statements made during a custodial interrogation.131  One scholar argues that 
in reality, since Fare was decided, most courts have found that juveniles vol-
untarily waive their Miranda rights, regardless of the circumstances.132 
Despite the fact that most states rely on the Fare totality test, seventeen 
	
 126 See Elizabeth J. Maykut, Who Is Advising Our Children: Custodial Interrogation of Juveniles in Florida, 21 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1345, 1372 (1994) (noting that “[p]roponents of the totality of the circum-
stances approach would argue that it adequately protects the juvenile by taking his or her age and 
IQ into account”).  
 127 Huang, supra note 14, at 448–49 (“The absence of any clear rules arguably places a child in the 
same situation as an adult.”); see also Thomas J. Von Wald, No Questions Asked! State v. Horse: A 
Proposition for a Per Se Rule When Interrogating Juveniles, 48 S.D. L. REV. 143, 160–61 (2003) (“[E]ach 
court has differed in the number of factors it used and the weight that each factor should receive.”).  
 128 See supra Introduction (discussing how two judges came to differently conclusions as to the voluntar-
iness of Dassey’s Miranda waiver with the same set of facts); see also Huang, supra note 14, at 449 
(“Additionally, a totality of circumstances approach increases the likelihood of inconsistent rulings, 
even on the same record.”).  
 129 See McGuire, supra note 9, at 1381 (recognizing the two major concerns of custodial interrogations: 
adequately protecting juveniles while not inhibiting police trying to solve serious crimes); see also 
Veto Message from Gov. Brown on Senate Bill 1052 (Sept. 30, 2016), 
https://www.gov.ca.gov/docs/SB_1052_Veto_Message.pdf [hereinafter Veto Message] (noting 
that “police investigators solve very serious crimes through questioning and the resulting admissions 
or statements that follow”).  California Governor Brown’s veto message represents an argument 
that the ability of law enforcement to solve serious crimes must not be disrupted.   
 130 Huang, supra note 14, at 449; see McGuire, supra note 9, at 1383 (“Most police officers do not have 
advanced clinical psychological training and generally have no relationship with the juvenile aspect.  As 
such, an average police officer is likely unprepared to make complicated psychological evaluations.”).  
 131 Huang, supra note 14, at 449 (“The totality approach only protects the juvenile after he or she has 
confessed to the police; it does nothing to help the juvenile make the decisions confronting him or 
her in the interrogation room.” (quoting Maykut, supra note 126, at 1372–74)).  
 132 See McGuire, supra note 9, at 1376 (“As a practical matter, these states have held that, regardless of 
the circumstances, a juvenile’s waiver is almost always voluntary”).  
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states provide additional procedural safeguards during custodial interroga-
tions of juveniles.133  A number of these per se rules were adopted on the 
assumption that juveniles are cognitively different from adults and therefore 
should be afforded special protections.134  Proponents of additional proce-
dural safeguards argue that unlike the Fare totality test, which provides an 
after-the-fact remedy, additional safeguards would provide law enforcement 
and courts with clear rules from the start.  For example, requiring the pres-
ence of an attorney or parent would provide an absolute prerequisite for ad-
mitting statements into evidence. 
Opponents to additional safeguards argue that requiring more rules 
would hinder the “interests of society and of justice.”135  For example, critics 
of requiring a juvenile to consult with an attorney before waiving Miranda 
rights argue that this would result in more juveniles remaining silent per their 
attorneys’ advice, which would deprive police with “an important crime-
fighting tool” and ultimately result in a “net loss for public safety.”136  Some 
even argue that additional rules could lead to a guilty juvenile getting away 
on a technicality.137  One scholar counters the cost to society and justice ar-
gument by challenging two of the argument’s assumptions—“[t]he first is 
that children will follow the advice of their counsel,” and “second is that a 
child’s confessions yield reliable evidence.”138  In fact, as explored above, the 
reliability of statements by juveniles is problematic because juveniles often 
submit to police pressure and will sometimes make false confessions.  
Additionally, opponents argue that more rules would add costs to an al-
ready burdened criminal justice system.139  They reason that rules requiring 
the presence of an attorney or interested adult would leave police with the 
financial and administrative burden of having to find these individuals before 
	
 133 Brief, supra note 112, at 8. 
 134 See Commonwealth v. A Juvenile (No. 1), 449 N.E.2d 654, 656 (Mass. 1983) (requiring a “mean-
ingful consultation with an informed adult” before waiving Miranda rights and noting that additional 
protections are supported by the fact that it has been the “legal system’s traditional policy . . . . [to] 
afford[ ] minors a unique and protected status”).  But see State v. Fernandez, 712 So. 2d 485, 489 
(La. 1998) (noting that additional protections are unnecessary because the “needs of juveniles can 
be accommodated by the totality of circumstances standard”).  
 135 Fernandez, 712 So. 2d at 489. 
 136 King, supra note 8, at 475. 
 137 See Fernandez, 712 So. 2d at 489 (“Excluding an otherwise valid confession of guilt just because the 
accused was a few months away from achieving non-juvenile status is simply too high a price to pay 
for the arguable benefit of more easily administering a per se rule that neither the framers of the 
Constitution nor the redactors of the Code of Criminal Procedure considered necessary.”).  
 138 King, supra note 8, at 476. 
 139 See Huang, supra note 14, at 462 (noting that there were fears “that requiring the presence and 
consultation of an interested adult ‘adds one more costly burden to our already heavily burdened 
justice system’” (quoting In re Dino, 359 So. 2d 586, 599 (La. 1978) (Sanders, C.J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part))).  
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every juvenile interrogation.140  However, proponents of per se rules argue 
that clear rules would actually minimize costs over time because it “provides 
courts a clear analytical framework to assess juvenile waivers.”141  Judicial 
resources could be conserved because clear rules would prevent numerous 
appeals and challenges to the application of the Fare totality test.  
Finally, proponents of additional safeguards argue that they are necessary 
because most states do not require interrogations to be recorded in their en-
tirety and therefore examining the totality of circumstances after-the-fact be-
comes problematic.  Figuring out what happened during an interrogation 
inevitably becomes very subjective.  Without the objectivity provided by a 
video recording, discovering what actually took place during interrogations 
can be difficult, especially when determining the key factors to be used in a 
Fare totality test, such as the presence of coercion and promises of leniency.142   
III.  AN ATTORNEY CONSULTATION SHOULD BE MANDATORY BEFORE 
JUVENILES WAIVE THEIR MIRANDA RIGHTS 
Although the Fare totality test and the patchwork of additional safeguards 
provide a framework for analyzing whether a juvenile voluntarily waived his 
or her Miranda rights, these federal and state requirements are inadequate in 
protecting juveniles.  Instead, mandatory rules requiring a juvenile to consult 
with an attorney before waiving Miranda rights would better prevent involun-
tary waivers and risks of false confessions.  Part A critiques the decision in Fare 
and analyzes how the Supreme Court departed from its earlier decisions that 
considered age as a fundamental factor.143  Part B explains why the current 
framework of allowing states to provide additional procedural safeguards is 
insufficient in guaranteeing protections for juveniles.144  Finally, Part C argues 
that the Court or each state should adopt a new, per se rule requiring an at-
torney consultation before a juvenile can waive his or her Miranda rights.145   
	
 140 See State v. Benoit, 490 A.2d 295, 302 (N.H. 1985) (“A per se approach would require mandating 
interested adult presence in every case . . . . Law enforcement agencies would have to adhere to this 
requirement in every case . . . . Adopting such an approach would result in onerous financial and 
administrative burdens. . . .”); Huang, supra note 14, at 466 (“A second disadvantage of the per se 
rule is that it increases the administrative burden on police to secure an interested adult’s presence 
prior to the juvenile’s interrogation.”).  
 141 Huang, supra note 14, at 467. 
 142 See id. at 470–71 (recommending that police videotape interrogations of juveniles because it avoids 
the disadvantages of the totality test by giving “courts ‘a complete picture of what actually took 
place during the interrogation,’ and ‘largely eliminate[s] frivolous claims of police misconduct.’” 
(alternation in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Lawrence Schlam, Police Interrogation of Children 
and State Constitutions: Why Not Videotape the MTV Generation?, 26 U. TOL. L. REV. 901, 925 (1995)).  
 143 See infra notes 146–54 and accompanying text. 
 144 See infra notes 155–67 and accompanying text. 
 145 See infra notes 168–87 and accompanying text. 
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A.  A Critique of Fare v. Michael C. 
In the Court’s earlier decisions in Haley and Gallegos, the Court recognized 
age as providing a special status for juveniles in custodial interrogations; youth 
was the “crucial factor.”146  Additionally, both Haley and Gallegos seemed to 
support additional procedural safeguards for juveniles in custodial interroga-
tion—requiring the advice or presence of a parent, guardian, or attorney.  In 
Haley, the Court stated that juveniles should receive “special care,” such as 
having counsel or someone else looking out for their interests during an inter-
rogation.147  The Court stated that providing additional safeguards for juve-
niles is important because a juvenile “needs counsel and support” and “needs 
someone on whom to lean.”148  Similarly, the Court in Gallegos reiterated the 
need to have an adult present to ensure that juvenile interests were repre-
sented.149  A juvenile needs the “aid of more mature judgment” because he or 
she “would have no way of knowing what the consequences of [a] confession 
were without advice.”150  Even in In re Gault, the Court stated, “[T]he greatest 
care must be taken to assure that [a juvenile’s] admission was voluntary.”151  
Despite the Court’s emphasis in Haley, Gallegos, and In re Gault on the im-
portance of treating juveniles with “special” and “the greatest care,” the 
Court provides a test in Fare that seems to depart from its reasoning in these 
earlier cases.  Yes, the Court in Fare recognized that juveniles might not have 
the maturity and experience to voluntarily waive Miranda rights; however, 
unlike earlier cases, the Court in Fare explicitly emphasizes the weighty inter-
est of law enforcement.152  Instead of ensuring the protection of juvenile in-
terests, the Fare totality test shifts protections to benefit courts and police 
through unlimited discretion in applying the test.  It is completely up to a 
judge in determining how much weight should be given to the fact that a 
juvenile, as opposed to an adult, waived his or her rights.153  By providing no 
	
 146 See Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 53 (1962) (“The youth of the suspect was the crucial factor 
in Haley” and “[t]he fact petitioner was only 14 years old puts this case on the same footing as 
Haley”); see also Huang, supra note 14, at 442 (noting that although the Court in Haley “relied upon 
several factors for its reversal, it emphasized the petitioner’s age above all”). 
 147 Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599–600 (1948). 
 148 Id. at 600.  
 149 See Gallegos, 370 U.S. at 54 (“Without some adult protection against this inequality, a 14-year-old 
boy would not be able to know, let alone assert, such constitutional rights as he had.”). 
 150 Id. 
 151 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967).  
 152 See Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725–26 (1979) (explaining that a totality of circumstances test 
does not “impos[e] rigid restraints on police and courts in dealing with an experienced older juve-
nile with an extensive prior record who knowingly and intelligently waives his Fifth Amendment 
rights and voluntarily consents to interrogation”). 
 153 See supra note 127 and accompanying text (explaining that “despite the fact that a number of courts 
may take into account age and the particular vulnerability of juveniles, courts may weigh the im-
portance of factors particular to juveniles differently; ‘[t]here is no assurance for example, that 
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guidance on how a factor like age should be weighed, the Fare totality test is 
simply too weak to protect children.  Thus, the Court appears to retreat from 
its earlier rationale that recognized age as providing a special status for juve-
niles in custodial interrogations.  One could argue that some judges will use 
the totality test to find that a Miranda waiver was involuntary, however, it is 
troubling that under the current test, a child as young as ten could be found 
to knowingly and intelligently waive his Miranda rights.154  
B.  Current Federal and State Requirements Are Inadequate at Protecting Juveniles 
The most concerning aspect of the current regime is that depending on 
the age of a child and where a child lives, the same set of facts can produce 
different outcomes.155  As outlined above, the Fare totality test ultimately pro-
vides the same protections as those provided to adults because the Court does 
not provide clear rules as to how age should factor into the test.156  Further-
more, although a number of states have made steps to protect juveniles 
through additional safeguards, states differ in the type of protection provided 
and the age at which it is guaranteed.157  Many of the state safeguards are 
applied in a tiered-approach, leaving older juveniles unprotected and forced 
into using the Fare totality test.   
Some argue that the safeguards in place, even applied to all juveniles, 
would remain insufficient at protecting children.  For example, a number of 
states require the advice or presence of a parent, guardian, or attorney before 
a child can waive his or her Miranda rights.158  Though the presence of a par-
ent or guardian may seem promising, researchers have found that parents 
	
courts will consider the empirical evidence that juveniles do not comprehend Miranda warnings as 
well as adults.’”).  
 154 See In re Joseph H., 367 P.3d 1, 1 (Cal. 2015) (Liu, J., dissenting) (dissenting from a denial of a 
petition for review of a lower court’s decision that a ten-year-old defendant validly waived his Mi-
randa rights).  
 155 See Brief, supra note 112, at 14 (explaining that the “picture that emerges from this survey of state 
laws [on juvenile Miranda rights] is of a patchwork of inconsistent, inadequate, and unpredictable 
rules”); McGuire, supra note 9, at 1376 (“Case law illustrates that the totality test can yield different 
results for similarly situated juveniles, which makes the admissibility of confessions—and possibly 
the prospect of life imprisonment—turn on where a juvenile committed the crime.”).  
 156 See Huang, supra note 14, at 448–49 (arguing that “[t]he absence of any clear rules arguably places 
a child in the same situation as an adult”).   
 157 See supra Part II.B. 
 158 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-2-511(1) (2017) (“No statements or admissions of a juvenile made 
as a result of the custodial interrogation of such juvenile by a law enforcement official concerning 
delinquent acts alleged to have been committed by the juvenile shall be admissible in evidence 
against such juvenile unless a parent, guardian, or legal or physical custodian of the juvenile was 
present at such interrogation and the juvenile and his or her parent, guardian, or legal or physical 
custodian were advised of the juvenile’s right to remain silent and that any statements made may 
be used against him or her in a court of law, of his or her right to the presence of an attorney during 
such interrogation, and of his or her right to have counsel appointed if he or she so requests at the 
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and/or guardians “often lack the experience and understanding necessary to 
advise the child of the risks and benefits of waiving or asserting his or her 
rights.”159  By not necessarily having the juvenile’s best interest in mind, the 
presence of a parent may not help protect a child being interrogated.160  In 
fact, parental presence may harm a child’s situation.161  
Even more troubling is the fact that—as more research proves that chil-
dren are cognitively different from adults, and as studies demonstrate that 
children cannot fully understand the legal implications of a Miranda waiver—
some states are eliminating procedural safeguards that they once had, and 
returning to the Fare totality test.162  For example, in State v. Fernandez, the 
Louisiana Supreme Court reversed a twenty-year-old rule that required con-
sultation with an attorney or informed parent before a juvenile could waive 
	
time of the interrogation; except that, if a public defender or counsel representing the juvenile is 
present at such interrogation, such statements or admissions may be admissible in evidence even 
though the juvenile’s parent, guardian, or legal or physical custodian was not present.”); IND. CODE 
§ 31-32-5-1 (2017) (“Any rights guaranteed to a child under the Constitution of the United States, 
the Constitution of the State of Indiana, or any other law may be waived only: . . . (2) by the child’s 
custodial parent, guardian, custodian or guardian ad litem if: (A) that person knowingly and volun-
tarily waives the right; (B) that person has no interest adverse to the child; (C) meaningful consulta-
tion has occurred between that person and the child; and (D) the child knowingly and voluntarily 
joins with the wavier . . . .”); Commonwealth v. A Juvenile (No. 1), 449 N.E.2d 654, 657 (Mass. 
1983) (“[F]or the Commonwealth successfully to demonstrate a knowing and intelligent waiver by 
a juvenile, in most cases it should show that a parent or an interested adult was present, understood 
the warnings, and had the opportunity to explain his [Miranda] rights to the juveniles so that the 
juvenile understands the significance of waiver of these rights.”); In re E.T.C., 449 A.2d 937, 940 
(Vt. 1982) (“[T]he following criteria must be met for a juvenile to voluntarily and intelligently waive 
his right against self-incrimination and right to counsel under chapter I, article 10 of the Vermont 
Constitution:  (1)  he must be given the opportunity to consult with an adult; (2) that adult must be 
one who is not only genuinely interested in the welfare of the juvenile but completely independent 
from and disassociated with the prosecution, e.g., a parent, legal guardian, or attorney representing 
the juvenile; and (3) the independent interested adult must be informed and be aware of the rights 
guaranteed to the juvenile.” (citing Commonwealth v. Barnes, 482 Pa. 555, 560 (1978))).  
 159 King, supra note 8, at 467 (“Many parents may feel that it is best for their child to talk to the police 
regardless of the risk and thereby be seen as cooperative.  In some cases, it is the parent who turned 
the child in to police or provided information leading the police to interview the child.”). 
 160 See Sandra Eismann-Harpen, Kentucky Should Mandate Attorney Consultation Before Juveniles Can Effectively 
Waive Their Miranda Rights, 40 N. KY. L. REV. 201, 215 (2013) (“Parents and guardians may have 
interests that conflict with the juvenile’s legal interests.”). 
 161 King, supra note 8, at 468 (“From [parents’] anger and justifiable need to understand what is going 
on, they may unwittingly encourage the child to answer questions, not anticipating how the child 
may incriminate him or herself.”); see also Eismann-Harpen, supra note 160, at 215 (noting that a 
child may be victim to abuse by a parent, that a parent may encourage a child to confess in order 
to get back to work, and that a parent may encourage a child to waive their right to counsel because 
of the potential financial burden of hiring an attorney).  A parent may even encourage their child 
to confess, whether false or not, “due to a belief that a confession will result in reduced or dismissed 
charges, a desire to punish the child for the alleged misconduct, or a belief that a confession is in 
the family’s best interests.”  Id. at 216 (citing Ellen Marrus, Can I Talk Now?: Why Miranda Does Not 
Offer Adolescents Adequate Protections, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 515, 531 (2006)).  
 162 See supra Part I.B (describing how science has proven that children are cognitively different from adults). 
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his or her Miranda rights.163  Louisiana abandoned these special protections 
for juveniles and returned to the Fare totality test.164  Pennsylvania also aban-
doned a longstanding rule requiring a consultation with an attorney, parent, 
or interested adult.  In Commonwealth v. Christmas, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court replaced the per se rule with a rebuttable presumption “that a state-
ment derived in the absence of such an opportunity for consultation is inad-
missible.”165  The court stated that the per se rule was “overly protective and 
unreasonably paternalistic.”166  A few years later in Commonwealth v. Williams, 
the court abandoned the rebuttable presumption rule and also returned to 
the totality test.167 
C.  Requiring a Consultation with an Attorney Before Waiving Miranda Rights Would 
Better Protect Juveniles 
Seeing that the Fare totality test and state requirements do not adequately 
protect juveniles’ Miranda rights, the Supreme Court, if given the oppor-
tunity, should adopt a new, per se rule requiring a juvenile to consult with an 
attorney before waiving his or her rights.168  If a juvenile is not provided an 
attorney and waives his or her rights, these statements should be inadmissible 
into evidence.  By providing a new federal requirement, states like Louisiana 
and Pennsylvania would not be able to add and remove additional safeguards 
as they please.  Although a federal requirement is ideal, it may be some time 
before an appropriate case reaches the Supreme Court.  Thus, each state 
should adopt similar per se rules requiring an attorney consultation.169  
Requiring an attorney consultation is important for a number of reasons.  
First, studies show that juveniles are unable to meet the adult standard for 
adequately comprehending Miranda rights.170  This is problematic because in 
	
 163 State v. Fernandez, 712 So. 2d 485, 486 (La. 1998). 
 164 See id. at 490. 
 165 465 A.2d 989, 992 (Pa. 1983). 
 166 Id. 
 167 475 A.2d 1283, 1288–89 (Pa. 1984) (Flaherty, J., concurring). 
 168 See Brief, supra note 112, at 16 (“Scientific data supports, at a minimum, a rule requiring that a child 
consult with an attorney before waiving his Fifth Amendment rights. . . . Modern scientific data 
would also support other prophylactic measures, such as the presence of an attorney during the 
entire custodial interrogation or a complete exclusion of children’s custodial statements.”). 
 169 See, e.g., S.B. 1052, 2015–2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016), https://leginfo.legisla-
ture.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201520160SB1052 (providing that “[p]rior to a 
custodial interrogation, and before the waiver of any Miranda rights, a youth under 18 years of age 
shall consult with legal counsel in person, by telephone, or by video conference.  The consultation 
may not be waived”).  California Senate Bill 1052, a law that would have ensured juveniles access 
to an attorney before being interrogated by law enforcement, was passed by the Assembly and 
Senate, but was eventually vetoed by the governor.  Veto Message, supra note 129.  Nevertheless, 
S.B. 1052 could be used as model legislation by other states.  
 170 Grisso, supra note 65, at 1152–54.  
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order for statements to be admissible, a juvenile must voluntarily, knowingly, 
and intelligently waive his or her Miranda rights.171  This means that a juve-
nile must waive his or her rights “with a full awareness of both the nature of 
the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon 
it.”172  So, if a juvenile cannot even comprehend his or her rights, assistance 
by someone more knowledgeable is necessary.173  As discussed above, requir-
ing a parent, guardian, or interested adult may be insufficient in protecting 
juveniles because these adults may not fully understand the legal ramifica-
tions of a Miranda waiver, or they may not necessarily have the juveniles’ legal 
interests in mind.174  Instead, an attorney is in the best position to provide 
juveniles with guidance, counsel, and advantageous legal advice. 
The Court missed an opportunity to potentially create a new federal re-
quirement by refusing to grant a petition of certiorari in Joseph H. v. California.  
If the Court heard the case, it would have been able to rule on the specific 
facts presented in the case, specifically whether a ten-year-old could volun-
tarily waive his Miranda rights.  In addition, the Court could have framed its 
holding broadly by adopting a new, categorical rule for all juveniles requiring 
an attorney consultation.175  At the very least, the Court could have clarified 
Fare by requiring lower courts to give significant weight to age as a factor in 
the totality test.  
Given another opportunity, the Court should revisit the Fare totality test, 
especially given the fact that the case was decided over thirty years ago.176  Since 
the 1979 Fare decision, science and other areas of Supreme Court jurisprudence 
have recognized the importance of differentiating between juveniles and 
adults.177  Science proves that because juveniles’ brains are not fully developed 
until the end of adolescence, they are not able to assess risks as well as adults, 
they favor immediate reward over long-term consequences, and they are vul-
nerable to external pressures.178  Relying on these facts, the Supreme Court has 
	
 171 Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724–25 (1979).  
 172 Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986).   
 173 See Petition, supra note 114, at 27 (“A regime in which children are interrogated without appropriate 
guidance ensures that the rights of those children will be systematically violated.”).  
 174 Supra Part III.B.  
 175 See Petition, supra note 114, at 19 (arguing that the Court should grant review to determine whether 
a ten-year-old could voluntarily waive his Miranda rights and that in hearing the case, the Court 
should “adopt a prophylactic rule requiring the presence of, and meaningful consultation with, an 
attorney or appropriate adult”).  
 176 See Brief, supra note 112, at 14 (“This Court, as the interpreter of the Constitution, should not leave 
to the states decisions of such constitutional import as the protections offered by the Fifth Amend-
ment, especially when . . . state laws are failing to adequately protect children’s rights.”).  
 177 See supra Part I.B (describing the science behind juvenile brain development and recent Supreme 
Court decisions that recognize the unique status of juveniles).  
 178 Police Report: REDUCING RISKS, supra note 40, at 4. 
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time and again reasoned that juveniles are therefore less culpable than adults.179  
Accordingly, the Supreme Court in Roper, Graham, and Miller held the following 
unconstitutional: subjecting a juvenile to the death penalty,180 sentencing a ju-
venile to life without the possibility of parole for a non-homicide,181 and man-
datory life without parole sentences for juveniles.182  Although these cases deal 
with sentencing, the Miranda waiver analysis should align itself “with other areas 
of American jurisprudence that apply different rules to juveniles under the age 
of eighteen.”183  If, however, the Fare totality test is left untouched, it will remain 
inconsistent with other areas of law by preserving a test that does not safeguard 
the particular vulnerabilities of juveniles.  
Although opponents of additional safeguards argue that per se rules would 
increase financial and administrative costs while interfering with effective po-
lice investigations, many of these concerns can be mitigated and are out-
weighed by a number of benefits.184  As described above, one of the most com-
pelling reasons for requiring an attorney consultation is the unacceptable risk 
of wrongfully convicting a juvenile due to incriminating statements or a false 
confession.  The benefit of preventing the wrongful conviction of juveniles 
should counteract the weight given to speedy and low-cost investigations. 
Also, the attorney consultation requirement could have an exception for 
outlier situations where there is an imminent threat to society.  For example, 
if California Senate Bill 1052 passed, it would have required an attorney con-
sultation prior to a custodial interrogation and before a juvenile could waive 
his or her Miranda rights.185  However, the bill provided an exception to this 
rule for situations where an officer “believed the information he or she sought 
was necessary to protect life or property from a substantial threat.”186  Addi-
tionally, clear rules could over time cut costs because challenges to the appli-
cation of the Fare totality test could be avoided.  For example, when Miranda 
v. Arizona was decided, similar concerns of costs and police interference were 
outweighed by the fact that a rigid rule had the “virtue of informing police 
and prosecutors with specificity as to what they may do in conducting custo-
dial interrogation, and of informing courts under what circumstances state-
ments obtained during such interrogation are not admissible.”187   
	
 179 See e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005) (holding that “juvenile offenders cannot with 
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 180 Id. at 570–71 (extending the prohibition of the death penalty to offenders under eighteen).  
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 182 Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 470 (2012) (stating juveniles cannot receive “mandatory life-with-
out-parole sentences.”).  
 183 Eismann-Harpen, supra note 160, at 226.  
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CONCLUSION 
The current federal and state mechanisms are inadequate at protecting 
juveniles.  By analyzing this issue through the lens of juvenile Miranda waivers 
and wrongful convictions, this Article exposes the need for more safeguards 
to ensure protections for vulnerable juveniles, specifically a mandatory rule 
requiring a juvenile to consult with an attorney before waiving his or her 
rights.  Science proves that children are cognitively different than adults.  
Studies demonstrate that children do not adequately understand Miranda 
rights and the legal implications of waiving those rights.  Absent an attorney 
consultation, juveniles often involuntarily waive their rights, leaving them 
completely vulnerable to interrogators.  Left unprotected, juveniles are more 
likely to succumb to coercive pressures that are hard for adults to even over-
come.  Consequently, during interrogations, juveniles will sometimes make 
incriminating statements or false confessions.  In most cases, the only protec-
tion left for a juvenile trying to prevent incriminating statements from being 
used against him or her is through challenging the voluntariness of a Miranda 
waiver.  Despite the fact that a juvenile may challenge the voluntariness of a 
waiver with the Fare totality test, a juvenile more often than not ends up fac-
ing an almost impossible uphill battle.  By failing to prove a Miranda waiver 
is involuntary, the admissibility of statements can in the worst scenarios lead 
to a wrongful conviction and many unjustifiable years in prison.  Attorney 
consultation will not solve all of the systemic failures contributing to the 
wrongful conviction of juveniles; however, it does provide a promising pro-
cedural protection against incriminating statements being unfairly used 
against vulnerable children. 
 
